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An  Analysis of the Effects of 
Uncertainty and Irreversibility on 
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Conservation Reserve Program 
Murat Isik and Wanhong Yang 
A real options model is developed to examine the determinants of farmer participation 
in  the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). This study contributes  to the  literature 
by developing a framework for ex post analysis of uncertainty and irreversibility. It 
extends the applications of real options models to analyze  farmer participation in the 
CRP. The model incorporates land and owner attributes, and determines whether 
uncertainty and irreversibility affect the probability of participation. Option values 
play a significant role in farmer decisions to retire land by reducing the probability 
of participation. These results have implications for the design and implementation 
of conservation programs. 
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Introduction 
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), established in 1985, aims at protecting the 
nation's  most environmentally sensitive cropland. In this voluntary land retirement 
program, farmers and ranchers enter into 10-  to 15-year contracts with the U.S. Depart- 
ment of Agriculture to take environmentally sensitive cropland out of  production. In 
exchange, landowners receive annual rental payments and cost-share assistance for 
establishing conservation practices to improve soil, water, and wildlife resources. Since 
the mid-1990s the CRP has enrolled land through a bidding process, in which contracts 
, are  accepted based on a soil-specific maximum acceptable bid cap determined in  advance 
of enrollment and an Environmental Benefit Index (EBI) composed of a set of environ- 
mental criteria.' Each bidder knows the bid cap and how scores in the environmental 
categories of the EBI are calculated before a bid is submitted. Submitted bids are then 
ranked based on the EBI relative to costs, and selections of  CRP contracts are made 
from these rankings. 
The CRP has gained rapid acceptance within the agricultural community and the 
general public. Land in the CRP increased from slightly over 2 million acres in 1986 to 
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'The bid cap is locally determined by soil productivity, local cash rental rates, and maintenance costs for conservation 
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enduring benefits, air quality, and state or national conservation priority area. Eligible acreage devoted to certain conserva- 
tion practices, such as  riparian buffers, filter strips, or grass strips, may be enrolled at  any  time under the continuous signup 
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about 34 million acres in 2003 W.S. Department of AgricultureIFarm Service Agency 
(USDA/FSA, 200311. As the nation's largest agri-environmental program, the CRP has 
made significant contributions in improving the quality of the  natural environment in the 
United States  (Ribaudo, 1990;  Feather, Hellerstein, and Hansen, 1999).  However, there 
also are  various concerns regarding the  rationale in determining land rental payments, 
enrollment in some states, and the program's environmental effectiveness (Claassen et 
al., 2001; U.S. General Accounting Office, 2002). For example, the CRP has had limited 
success in promoting cropland conversion to more permanent uses (Schatzki, 1998).' 
Additionally, some states  in the  Northeast region experienced relatively low enrollment 
rates in the CRP during the 1990s (USDA/FSA, 2003). As of October 2001, the  CRP was 
not very effective in targeting environmentally sensitive land, and enrollment in many 
states  was very low in the  continuous CRP (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2002, p. 14). 
Clearly, it  is very important to examine the  factors affecting farmer participation in the 
CRP. An understanding of these motivating factors could be helpful to policy makers in 
improving the design and implementation of such crucial conservation programs and 
their cost-effectiveness. 
This research problem, however, is complex. Farmers' participation decisions in the 
CRP involve various sources of uncertainty, irreversibility, and some leeway in the timing 
of participation. With CRP participation, farmers face a decision between uncertain 
farming income, which may be caused by fluctuating crop prices and yields, and 
uncertain program payments from one signup period to the next, which is associated 
with possible changes in government policies. Land rental payments received by farmers 
from the CRP are  related to the returns from agriculture or cash rental rates, and could 
change from one signup to the next because of  changes in agricultural and environ- 
mental policies, profitability of agriculture, and cash rental markets. For example, his- 
torical data on the CRP payments in Illinois counties show that the average fluctuation 
in land rental payments was about 18.6% between 1988 and 2002 (USDA/FSA, 2003), 
while the returns from agricultural production fluctuated about 22.5% between 1950 
and 2002. This variability of the CRP payments is also observed at  the national level. 
Average payments increased from $52/acre in 1988 to $78.80/acre in 2001, while the 
rental rates fluctuated between 5.5% and 24.7% annually across the United States 
(USDA/FSA, 200313 
Moreover, under the terms of the CRP fured-period participation contract, farmers 
must make an  irreversible decision to enroll in the  CRP. However, farmers are  given the 
option of delaying enrollment decisions to learn more about economic conditions and 
government policies before making this irreversible decision. Although farmers who 
participate in the  program are  entitled to receive guaranteed annual payments over the 
program participation period, by delaying their participation decision and exercising the 
option to enroll later, they could receive different annual payment amounts in a future 
signup period. By waiting, farmers could also observe what the bids were. Additionally, 
the  initial conversion costs (i.e., establishing conservation practices) are  sunk. Thus, the 
option to retire land is valuable because uncertainty and irreversibility of the CRP, as 
Stavins and JaiTe (1990)  point out that only 3249%  of the landowners in the Mississippi Delta convert land when it is 
optimal according to the net present value rule, suggesting the presence of factors  not accounted for in their decision  making. 
Some parts of the observed variability in the rental payments at the county level and at the state level could be due to 
the types of land parcels bid into the program each year. Although we found similar fluctuations of the rental rates at the 
watershedlevel, amore accurate representation  of the variability  would be to determine  the fluctuations at the soil type level. 244  August 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
well as  the  ability to delay decision making, are  important factors influencing participa- 
tion decisions in the CRP. 
The  purpose of this study is  to develop a model of decision making to examine the  fac- 
tors  affecting farmer participation in  the  CRP under uncertainty. The model incorporates 
uncertainty and irreversibility characteristics of CRP participation to estimate  the 
probability of participation. The  empirical application examines  the  extent  to  which 
uncertainty and irreversibility affect the probability of farmer participation in the CRP 
by taking into account land benefits, land characteristics, and owner attributes. The 
results from this analysis have implications for the design and implementation of 
conservation programs, and development of estimates of environmental program per- 
formance. 
Several earlier studies  have examined the  factors affecting farmer participation in the 
CRP, post-CRP land use decisions, and wetland reserve programs using discrete choice 
models. Various factors affecting farmer participation in  the  CRP  were identified. Socio- 
economic variables such as farm tenure and farmer age, economic factors such as 
returns and bid cap, soil erosion rate, and location of  counties have been found to 
influence the probability of farmer CRP participation (Shoemaker, 1989; Konyar and 
Osborn, 1990; McLean, Hui, and Joseph, 1994; Skaggs, Kirksey, and Harper, 1994; 
Kalaitzandonakes and Monson, 1994;  Cooper and Osborn, 1998).  Likewise, participation 
in wetlands reserve programs is affected by similar factors such as land and owner 
attributes (Parks and Kramer, 1995). However, these studies assume deterministic 
decision making, and therefore do not take  into account uncertainty and irreversibility 
associated with CRP participation. 
Farmer participation in  the  CRP is analogous to technology adoption decisions under 
uncertainty. When technology adoption involves an  irreversible decision and the decision 
maker can wait to learn more about the value of  technology or economic conditions, 
value ofwaiting  may exist,  which delays investment decisions (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
Although a growing body of  literature has recently applied the theory of investment 
under uncertainty to analyze the adoption of agricultural technologies (e.g., Isik, 2004; 
Isik, Khanna, and Winter-Nelson, 2001; Carey and Zilberman, 2002), land use change 
(e.g., Schatzki, 1998; Capozza and Li, 1994; Geltner, Riddiough, and Stojanovic, 1996), 
and entry-exit decisions (e.g., Isik et  al., 2003), the  theory of irreversible investment has 
seldom been used as a basis of econometric models for ex post analysis of  uncertainty 
and irreversibility. 
In this study, we examine whether option values affect farmer decision making by 
developing a behavioral econometric model. Thus,  this  study extends the  existing litera- 
ture  on CRP participation by taking  into account uncertainty and irreversibility of CRP 
participation based on a real options model. It  contributes to the  literature by incorpor- 
ating uncertainty and irreversibility of  the CRP in estimation of  the participation 
probabilities. This analysis also extends the literature on the empirical applications of 
real options models by providing a framework for ex post analysis of uncertainty and 
irreversibility. 
The Theoretical Model 
A risk-neutral farmer's participation decision in  the  CRP is  examined under uncertainty 
about crop returns and land rental payments. The  returns from agricultural production Isik and Yang  Farmer Participation in the Conservation Reserve Program  245 
at  time Tare  denoted by nT(q;  q), where q is the land quality and q represents farmer 
characteristics that influence profitability of crop production (such as  age). The returns 
from crop production are uncertain due to uncertainty about output prices, crop yields, 
and weather conditions. The farmer has the option to participate in the CRP and can 
receive an annual rental payment, VT(q;  q), for program participation at  time T. Land 
rental payments to be received could also be uncertain because of possible changes in 
returns from agricultural production, cash rental rates, the EBI, or agricultural policies 
from year to year. In particular, there exists uncertainty about the future prospect of 
environmental policies regarding which instruments to use in controlling  nonpoint pollu- 
tion. The farmer who decides to enroll in the program must enter into a 7tyear  contract. 
This nature of the CRP characterizes the irreversibility effect of the participation 
decision. 
The farmer  who participates in the CRP is responsible for a portion of the total restor- 
ation costs, (1  - A)K(q). The farmer receives the remaining restoration costs, AK(q), as 
incentive payments for participation. It is assumed there is no uncertainty about the 
restoration costs. The expected present value of the foregone agricultural returns from 
crop production plus the restoration costs is defined as the opportunity costs of  parti- 
cipation in the CRP, which is used to determine the minimum rental rate required for 
participation. 
Farmer Participation in the CRP Under Uncertainty 
We assume that n and V evolve according to the following stochastic  processes (as  in 
Capozza and Li, 1994;  Schatzki, 1998;  Isik, Khanna, and Winter-Nelson, 2001; Carey 




where dz is the increment of a Wiener process with mean zero and unit variance, a is 
the drift parameter, a is the volatility in the drift parameter, and E(dz,dzV) = ydt. The 
parameter y represents the covariance between changes in n and V.  Uncertainty 
associated with n and V could be correlated due to the common shocks affecting both 
returns from agricultural production and land rental payments received by farmers. 
Several studies have noted that returns from agricultural production or output prices 
can be represented by a geometric Brownian motion (Isik, Khanna, and Winter-Nelson, 
2001; Schatzki, 1998;  Carey and Zilberman, 2002).  It  is  reasonable to assume that  rental 
payments are related to the returns from agriculture and can be conveniently repre- 
sented by the same stochastic process. 
Geometric Brownian motion is chosen to preserve analytical clarity and ensure tractability in the theoretical model as 
well as to develop an econometric model for cross-sectional  data. This hypothesis is consistent with most theoretical and em- 
pirical models assessing option values. We  also tested this hypothesis. The augmented  Dickey-Fuller  tests reported later in 
table 2 do not reject a random walk for agricultural returns for the data used in the empirical application.  However, the time 
series of rental rate data is too short for these tests to be conclusive. General conclusions on the effects of uncertainty still 
hold when rental payments follow an alternative stochastic process (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Dixit, 1993; Schatzki, 1998). 246  August 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
To illustrate  the  impacts of uncertainty and irreversibility, we first determine  the 
minimum rental rate required by a farmer to participate in the CRP using the net 
present value  (NPV) rule. Under the  NPVrule, the  farmer should participate in  the  CRP 
if the expected present value of the land rental payment to be received is greater than 
or equal to the expected present value of the  foregone returns from crop production plus 
the restoration costs. The present value of the expected land rental payment that can 
be received over the T-year CRP contract at  year T (with a,  = 0)  is specified as: 
where VT is the annual land rental payment to be received at  year T, and p is the 
discount rate. The expected present value of the  foregone agricultural revenues plus the 
restoration costs at  year T is given by: 
- 
nT(l  -  e-(~-az)T 
C(nT,  K) =  + (1  - A)K. 
(p - a,) 
Thus,  under the  NPV  rule which ignores the  uncertainty and irreversibility of the  CRP, 
the  farmer will enroll in the CRP at  year zero if at  least C(nO,  K)  is received for partici- 
pation, i.e., 
In other words, C(nO,  K)  can also be considered as  the farmer's willingness to accept for 
participation in the CRP. Under the NPV  rule, this value would also correspond to the 
minimum amount the farmer bids for participation. 
When the farmer has the option to delay the participation decision in the CRP, the 
present value of the expected land rental payment to be received, R(VT),  changes from 
one signup period to the next with the changes in VT, i.e., R(VT) at year 2 is equal to 
V,(1-  e -pT)/p, and it can be characterized with the same stochastic process given in (2). 
By delaying participation decisions and keeping the opportunity to participate in the 
program in the  future, the farmer could obtain a different stream of rental payments, 
R(VT),  in future CRP signup periods. 
We now incorporate uncertainty and irreversibility of the  CRP  into  the  farmer's parti- 
cipation decision and determine the  rental rates required to participate in the  CRP using 
dynamic optimization techniques. The farmer will face the same participation decision 
after the  contract is expired. The farmer chooses enrollment year T that maximizes the 
net present value of returns subject to (1)  and (2) as: 
Use of dynamic  programming then reveals the  following critical value of the  land rental 
payment to be received over T years (R(VG))  at  which it is optimal to enroll in  the CRP 
(refer to the appendix for additional computational details and discussion): Isik and Yang  Farmer Participation in the Conservation Reserve Program  247 
where p > 1  is the larger root of  0.5(a;  - 2yava,  + oz)~(p  - 1)  + (av - a,@ -  (p - a,) = 0. 
Equation (4) can be rewritten as 
to represent the annual threshold rental payment in which the farmer is indifferent 
between enrolling and maintaining the land in  agriculture.=  This value would represent 
the minimum rental  rate required for participation or the farmer's willingness to accept 
for participation in the CRP under uncertainty and irreversibility. Thus, the threshold 
rental  payment would correspond to the  minimum amount the farmer  bids to participate 
in the CRP under uncertainty." 
The participation decision under uncertainty and irreversibility requires the present 
value of the rental payment to be received, R(VT),  to be greater than the expected 
present value of the foregone returns from crop production plus the restoration costs, 
C(nT,  K), by a factor of P/(p - 1)  > 1. The magnitude of this factor determines the extent 
to which uncertainty and irreversibility of the CRP affect the  participation decision. The 
option-value multiplier P/(P - 1)  increases if the expected growth in n (a,) increases or 
if the expected growth in the present value of rental payment (a,)  decreases. The multi- 
plier will decrease if p or y increases. Holding their variances fured, a greater covariance 
between changes in n and R(VT)  implies less uncertainty over their ratio, hence a reduced 
incentive to wait for participation. The option-value multiplier also increases if the vola- 
tility in n and/or R(VT)  increases. 
The critical value of the land rental payment required for participation in the CRP 
given in (4) can be written as 
This expression  indicates the farmer requires the land rental payments to be greater than 
the expected returns  from crop production plus the restoration costs by C(nT,  K)/(P - 1)  >  0, 
in order to participate in the CRP. This value, C(nT,  K)/@ - I),  can be considered as  the 
value of waiting to participate in the CRP in the future. Under uncertainty and irreversi- 
bility, the  value of waiting is added to the opportunity costs of participation because the 
farmer gives up the option to participate in the program in the future. These results ex- 
tend the literature by incorporating uncertainty and irreversibility of the CRP into the 
participation decision. Ignoring uncertainty and irreversibility  of the CRP participation 
decision would overestimate the probability of farmer participation in the CRP. 
Empirical Application 
The empirical application of the theoretical model focuses on farmer participation deci- 
sions under uncertainty and irreversibility of the CRP to develop an econometric  model 
for cross-sectional  data. The empirical model identifies  various factors that may influence 
When there is no uncertainty about V [and therefore R(V,)],  the critical value of the land rental payment is R(v,') = 
((P, -1)IP2)C(nT,  K),  where P, < 0  is the smaller root of 0.5o:p(p -1) - a,p - p = 0. 
In actual implementation of the program, however, the bids submitted by the farmer could be modified depending on the 
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farmers7  decisions to enroll in the CRP. Participation by landowners in the CRP is 
measured using the proportion of  county cropland offered to the CRP. Each county is 
analyzed as  a representative farm possessing the average characteristics of  that county. 
The factors affecting  participation probabilities in the CRP are examined using the pro- 
portions of  the land offered to the CRP in counties considered. 
Equation (4) defines the threshold rental payment required for participation in the 
CRP. The farmer's choice to restore a tract of  agricultural land to the CRP depends on 
whether the annual land rental payment to be received is higher than the threshold 
rental payment defined by: 
Let V,*(C,  K, p) describe the per acre threshold land rental payment relevant to county 
i. This threshold is expected to be lower than the exogenously determined soil-specific 
bid caps for farmers who participate in the program. While the threshold may not be 
observed, it is possible to observe the land uses on the land tract and some attributes 
of  the tract which may indicate its suitability for devotion to agricultural production or 
the CRP. The land use observed is an indication of  whether its opportunity costs of  the 
crop production plus restoration costs are above or below the threshold rental payment. 
Measurable attributes relevant to the unobservable land rental thresholds may include 
components of  land benefits, soil quality indicators, socioeconomic variables, the CRP 
participation benefits, and the bid cap. 
The probability of  some parcels drawn from county i, with observable characteristics 
q,  has a probability of  enrolling (P,),  which is defined as the probability that V,  = g(q6) 
is greater than the unobservable threshold V,*. Here, V,  = g(56)  is a rental payment 
index and measures the expected rental payment to be received by lands with attributes 
q.  The vector is specified so that the probability of  land with attributes q  drawn ran- 
domly from the land base enrolled in the CRP in county i is Pi = Pr(V,*  < g(%  G)),  where 6 
is the parameter vector to be estimated. This probability is bounded by zero and one. 
The relationship between V, and Pi is assumed to form a logistic cumulative  distribu- 
tion function: 
We  solve (6) for g(56)  to approximate the probability with the proportion of  land acres 
offered to the CRP in county i,  fi.  Minimum x2 methods in grouped data are then used 
to estimate the probability of  participation (Maddala, 1987) as follows: 
where  fi is the proportion of land acres offered to the CRP in county i. The grouping was 
done across producers with eligible lands, following Parks and Kramer (1995). 
The parameters 6 in (7)  are estimated using observations  on fi,  the proportion of acres 
offered to the CRP in county i. This is consistent with the approach used by Parks and 
Kramer (1995) in their study of the Wetlands Reserve Program. A linear function of 
parameters is estimated-i.e.,  g(56)  = ~6 + ui.  Maddala's correction was used for the Isik and Yang  Farmer Participation in the Conservation Reserve Program  249 
heteroskedasticity exhibited by ui  in  grouped logit models. Note that  x, also includes the 
parameters of  the value of  waiting. Although this method does not explicitly allow 
quantifying  the impact of the  value ofwaiting  on the  participation probabilities, it  illus- 
trates the extent to which this value affects the participation probabilities by adding P 
or P/(P - 1)  as  an  independent variable in  the  regression. These parameter estimates allow 
the  probability of participation in the CRP to be estimated for each county and quantify 
the  impacts of uncertainty and irreversibility of the  CRP on the participation decisions. 
However, the estimated coefficients are insufficient to show direct impacts of variables 
on participation probabilities. Therefore, the elasticities of probability for some of the 
explanatory  variables are  also estimated. These elasticities show the  percentage change 
in  the  probability of participation associated with a 1% change in an explanatory variable 
considered. The elasticity of probability for variable j in county i is obtained as: 
where Pij is defined by (6). 
We use a two-step procedure described by Wooldridge (2002, p. 474) to test the possi- 
bility of endogeneity of some of the variables used in  the estimation of (7). This procedure 
determines whether some of the variables are endogenous andlor whether endogeneity 
has any effect on consistency of their estimate. To determine whether the  variable x, is 
endogenous, we first run the ordinary least squares regression x, on other independent 
variables and save the  residual (v). Next, (7)  is  re-estimated with the residual  v included 
as an additional independent variable. We  then test the null hypothesis that x,  is 
exogenous in  the estimated model by determining whether the coefficient on v is equal 
to zero. 
Data 
The model developed above is applied to farmer participation in  the CRP in Illinois using 
data  from 100  counties. In  Illinois, 811,926 acres of land  were contracted under the  CRP 
between 1986 and 1993. From 1996, the earliest contracts started to expire and caused 
fluctuations of the  CRP acreage. In 1997,  the active Illinois CRP contracts had 732,345 
acres (Illinois Agricultural Statistics Service, 2001). With increasing enrollment in recent 
years, Illinois CRP land reached 944,944 acres by 2002, representing about 3.4% of the 
cropland in Illinois. The CRP  pays an  annual rental rate based on the  rental value of the 
land, and 50% of the costs of establishing grasses or trees on the land enrolled. 
Farmer  participation in  the CRP is  measured using the proportion of the eligible crop- 
land offered to the CRP. These cross-section data are merged at  the county level with 
the economic data and farmer characteristics in  Illinois counties. Descriptive statistics 
of the  data used in the estimation are  presented in table 1. The probability of participa- 
tion is estimated using the average county-level data. To be eligible for CRP participation, 
the  land must  be: (a)  cropland that  was planted or considered planted to an  agricultural 
commodity on hydric soils, or (b)  marginal pastureland suitable for practices such as 
riparian buffers, filter strips, grassed waterways, shelterbelts,  or field windbreaks. Eli- 
gible land data are obtained from the 1997 National Resources Inventory [USDAI 
Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), 19971. 250  August 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used in the Estimation 
Standard 
Variable  Mean  Deviation 
Proportion of Land Offered to the CRP  0.046  0.042 
Bid Cap ($/acre)  93.970  21.048 
Value of Crops Sold ($/acre)  275.950  73.636 
Crop Production Costs ($/acre)  171.690  52.379 
Government Payments ($/acre)  16.459  22.575 
Environmental Benefit Index (EBI)  209.600  19.095 
Proportion of Land in Land Capability Classes (LCCs) I or I1  0.422  0.023 
Proportion of Cropland Idle  0.094  0.009 
Average Age of Operator (years)  53.560  1.395 
Proportion of Land Operated by Full- or Part-Time Owners  0.838  0.073 
p/(p -1)  1.525  0.812 
Data on the land acres offered to the CRP from 100 Illinois counties during signup 
#18 of the CRP were obtained from the Farm Service Agency (USDA/FSA, 2003). The 
average bid cap for each county and the average EBI of each county were also obtained 
from the  Farm Service Agency. The bid cap influences the rental rates and participation 
decision of farmers (Shoemaker, 1989). The EBI also plays a role in determining suita- 
bility of the land for enrollment in the CRP. The EBI depends on six environmental 
factors and a cost component. The environmental factors are determined based on the 
following point system: wildlife habitat benefits, 0-100  points; water quality benefits, 
0-100 points; on-farm benefits, 0-100 points; long-term benefits, 0-50 points; air  quality 
benefits, 0-35  points; and conservation priority area, 0-25  points. The cost component 
of the  EBI for signup #18 includes 15  points for requested rental payment relative to  the 
maximum acceptable payment for soils offered, 10  points if no cost-share for cover estab- 
lishment is requested, and up to 125 points depending on the per acre rental payment 
requested with a formula [I25  * (1 -  R/165), where R is the  rental rate  bid]. Prior to selec- 
tion of contracts, the  total environmental component and the  cost component of the  EBI 
are  reweighted. To avoid endogeneity associated with the cost component in  the  estima- 
tions, only the total environmental component of the EBI is used in our analysis. 
Under CRP participation, an economic decision is made to forego the use of environ- 
mentally sensitive lands for agricultural purposes. The opportunity cost of CRP partici- 
pation is made up of crop net returns and farm program payments. Data related to the 
agricultural opportunity costs are obtained from the 1997 U.S.  Census of  Agriculture 
WSDALNational Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), 19991. Crop revenues per acre 
consist of the value of crops sold in a county. Crop costs per acre include the costs of 
seed,  fertilizer, chemicals, petroleum, electricity, labor, and other customwork costs. Per 
acre government payments other than the CRP payments received by farmers are also 
considered as  opportunity costs of crop production. 
Land quality indices for each county include the  proportion of land in  Land Capability 
Classes (LCCs)  I and 11, and the proportion of the land idle. These measures are  obtained 
from the 1997  National Resources Inventory (USDAINRCS, 1997),  which defines the land 
quality  for producing crops. LCCs I and I1  represent well-suited land for crop production. Isik and Yang  Farmer Participation in the Conservation Reserve Program  25 1 
The vector q for a county includes characteristics of  land users in the county. The pro- 
portion of idle land is also included as a measure of land quality. Farmer characteristics 
for a county from the 1997 U.S.  Census ofAgriculture (USDAINASS, 1999)  include the 
average age of  the farm operators and proportion of  the area operated by full- or part- 
time owners in the county. 
We determine whether the profits can be represented with a geometric Brownian 
motion using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981)  unit root test: 
where N is the number of  lags selected on the basis of  the likelihood-ratio test. A unit 
root test is conducted by comparing the sum of  squared residuals from the unrestricted 
version in (8) and a restricted regression with @,  = 1  and 4, = 0 using an  F-test. The esti- 
mated F-statistic is found to be lower than the critical value (p-value  is 0.39). The results 
of  a z-test on the coefficients  @,  - 1  and @,  are  reported in table 2. Both tests fail to reject 
the null hypothesis of  nonstationarity. These results validate the assumption of  a geo- 
metric Brownian motion. 
To estimate the uncertainty parameter (p) in (4), historical data on crop returns and 
average historical rental payments received by participants in a county are used. The 
values of  p for each county in Illinois are estimated using the real returns and rental pay- 
ments received by farmers. The drift parameter is estimated as a,  = m + (0.5)a:,  where m 
is the mean of  the series ln(n,+,/n,), and a, is the standard deviation of  the series 
(Forsyth, 2000). 
Because the profit shocks may have both transitory and permanent components, the 
standard deviation is dissected into permanent and transitory standard deviation 
(uncertainty)  components. To isolate these components of  total uncertainty, we use the 
decomposition technique developed by Hall and Mishkin (1982)  and expanded by Carroll 
(1991).  Only the permanent component of the standard deviation is used in the analysis. 
Using historical data on average crop returns (crop yields and output prices) from 
corn and soybean productions over the period 1950-2002 in Illinois (USDMNASS, 
2003), the values of a, and a, are  estimated for each county in Illinois. Similarly,  the 
values of a, and a, are  obtained using the historical rental payments data available 
between 1988 and 2002 in each county in Illinois (USDIVFSA, 2003). Correlation 
between a, and a, is also estimated for each county. A 5% discount rate is assumed 
in the estimation of  p. 
Results 
Table 3 presents the parameters of  the estimated grouped logit models for farmer 
participation in the CRP in Illinois counties. To quantify the impacts of  uncertainty and 
irreversibility of the CRP on the probability of  participation, two alternative models are 
estimated: Model I in which P is used as an independent variable, and Model I1 in which 
p/(P -1) is used as an independent variable. Two alternative models are estimated to 
illustrate the robustness of  the impacts of uncertainty and irreversibility on the 
participation decisions. An increase in P reduces the option-value multiplier p/(P -  11, 
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Note: Critical values for the t-statistic at the 5% and 10%  siwcance  levels are 2.4 and 2.8, respectively (Dickey 
and Fuller, 1981). 
Table 2. Results of Dickey-Fuller  Unit Root Test for Nonstationarity of Profit 
Table 3. Grouped  Logit Model Parameter  Estimates  for Proportion  of County 
Land Offered 
Parameter 
Variable  Estimate  t-Statistic 
40  5.392  4.562 
4=  - 1  -0.915  -2.015 
4  -0.009  -2.189 
41  0.003  0.061 
MODEL  I  MODEL  I1 
Parameter  Elasticity of  Parameter  Elasticity of 
Variable  Estimate  Probability  Estimate  Probability 
Constant  -  14.970***  -9.678*** 
(1.672)  (2.588) 
Bid Cap ($/acre)  0.037***  3.122  0.027***  2.724 
(0.002)  (0.002) 
Value of Crops Sold ($/acre)  -0.005***  -0.559  -0.007***  -0.741 
(0.001)  (0.004) 
Crop Production Costs ($/acre)  0.002*  0.262  0.004**  0.352 
(0.001)  (0.002) 
Government Payments ($/acre)  -0.002*  -0.239  -0.002*  -0.161 
(0.001)  (0.001) 
Environmental Benefit Index (EBI)  0.009***  0.956  0.006***  0.648 
(0.001)  (0.001) 
Proportion of Land in LCCs I or I1  -0.518***  -0.548*** 
(0.102)  (0.109) 
Proportion of  Cropland Idle  0.030**  0.040** 
(0.014)  (0.018) 
Average Age of Operator (years)  0.041***  0.048*** 
(0.012)  (0.015) 
Proportion of Land Operated by Full- or  6.896***  5.393*** 
Part-Time Owners  (1.265)  (0.248) 
P  0.102***  5.866  -  - 
(0.012) 
P/(P - 1)  -  -  -0.027***  -2.359 
(0.008) 
Parameter 
Variable  Estimate  t-Statistic 
4%  -0.013  -0.271 
43  0.025  0.537 
44  0.059  1.291 
R 
Log Likelihood Function 
Notes:  Single,  double, and triple asterisks (*)denote  statistical significance at  the lo%,  5%,  and 1%  levels, respec- 
tively. Values in parentheses are standard errors. 
The coefficients of  both P and P/(P - 1)  are found to be statistically significant at the 
1%  level, indicating that an increase in uncertainty and irreversibility of the CRP 
participation decisions represented by a decrease in P or an increase in P/(P - 1)  leads 
to a decrease in the participation probabilities. The elasticity of  probability with 
respect to P/(P -1)  is found to be relatively high (-2.36).  These results are consistent Isik and Yang  Farmer Participation in the Conservation Reserve Program  253 
with findings of other empirical research examining the  effects of option values on land 
use decisions (Schatzki, 1998;  Capozza and  Li, 1994;  Geltner, Riddiough, and Stojanovic, 
1996). Based on the results of  our analysis, option values play an important role in 
farmer decisions to retire land, and decrease the probability of farmer participation in 
the CRP. From these findings, farmers would require a premium over agricultural profits 
to enroll in the CRP. 
This analysis also examines the  impacts of various economic factors and socioeconomic 
variables on the participation probabilities. In  both models given in table 3, all the  vari- 
ables considered here are statistically significant. As expected, the bid cap has positive 
impacts on the participation decisions. The CRP contracts are accepted based on a bid 
cap which is calculated in advance of  enrollment. The bid cap is included to explain 
participation decisions because it  influences the  rental rates received and participation 
decisions of farmers. The probability is elastic with respect to the  rental bid. The respec- 
tive elasticities of the bid cap for Models I and I1 are 3.12 and 2.72. 
An increase in agricultural benefits from crop production is expected to decrease the 
probability of participation in the CRP because it  increases the opportunity costs of 
participation in the program. In the model, this corresponds to increases in the value 
of crop production or decreases in the crop production costs. The negative coefficients 
for the value of  crop production and the positive coefficients for the production costs 
(table 3) are consistent with these interpretations. These findings suggest increases in 
the value from crop production andfor decreases in the production costs will likely 
reduce the probability of participation in the CRP. However, the probabilities are  found 
to be inelastic with respect to the  value of crop production and the  production costs. The 
respective estimated elasticities of the  value of crop production for Models I and I1 are 
-0.56 and -0.74, and the  corresponding estimated elasticities of probability with respect 
to the production costs are 0.26 and 0.35. 
Government payments are also included as a measure of  the opportunity costs of 
enrollment in the CRP. The negative and statistically significant coefficient for this 
variable reveals that government payments received by farmers, other than the CRP 
payments, have a negative impact on the participation decision. This result is reasonable 
because these payments increase the  opportunity costs of crop production, and  therefore 
the  opportunity costs of participation in the  CRP. However, the  participation probability 
is inelastic with respect to the government payments (table 3), with elasticities of prob- 
ability found to be -0.24 in Model I and -0.16 in Model 11. 
As soil quality and environmental quality variables, proportion of the land in Land 
Capability Classes I and 11, proportion of idle cropland, and the Environmental Benefit 
Index are included in the estimations. LCCs I and I1 measure the land's suitability for 
crop production. Higher proportions of land in  these categories are  expected to lower 
enrollment in the CRP. The negative coefficients for the proportion of  LCCs I and I1 
(table 3) are consistent with this interpretation. The positive coefficient for the propor- 
tion of cropland idle indicates that  the higher the  proportion of idle cropland in a county, 
the higher is the probability of CRP participation in that county. The idle cropland in 
a county may be an indicator of  the environmental sensitivity of  that county's land. 
Thus, an increase in a county's idle cropland increases the probability of farmer partici- 
pation in the CRP. 
The EBI is included as an environmental quality indicator of a county. Proportion of 
the land enrolled in the CRP in a county could depend on the EBI rankings of that 
county because the CRP contracts are selected by taking into account the EBI rankings 254  August2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
of  the land offered to the CRP. As  observed in table 3, the coefficient on the EBI is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1%  level in both models, showing that the 
higher the EBI, the higher is the probability of participation. This result is consistent 
with the actual implementation of the program in which contracts are accepted based 
on the EBI rankings relative to costs. The probability of participation is inelastic with 
respect to the EBI for both of the estimated models, as indicated by elasticities of 0.96 
for Model I and 0.65  for Model 11. 
The impacts of  socioeconomic factors on the participation probabilities are also re- 
ported in table 3. Older farmers are  expected to participate more in the CRP as a means 
of partial retirement. It  is also reasonable to expect that counties with higher proportions 
of full- or part-time landowners have higher participation rates. These expectations are 
consistent with the results obtained from the estimated models, i.e., older farmers and 
higher proportions of land operated by part- or full-time owners have higher partici- 
pation probabilities. These results are  consistent with findings reported by other studies 
examining the  factors affecting participation in the CRP and wetland reserve programs 
(McLean, Hui, and Joseph, 1994;  Kalaitzandonakes and Monson, 1994;  Parks and 
Kramer, 1995). 
We tested the potential endogeneity of some of the variables used in the estimations 
of Model I and Model 11. The estimated coefficients on the residuals for several inde- 
pendent variables are reported in table 4.  The null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be 
rejected for any of the  variables tested. To test the stability of the option-value parameter 
in the estimated models, results of several alternative models are provided in table 5. 
We kept the parameter P/(P -1)  in the model and dropped some of  the important 
variables from Model I1  to determine  whether the sign and significance of the  coefficient 
on this variable would change. These alternative models (Models  111, IVY  V, VI, and VII) 
found that the parameter estimates for P/(P -  1)  are quite stable. The impact of uncer- 
tainty and irreversibility on farmer participation appears to be reasonably robust to 
alternative specifications. 
Conclusions 
This study has examined the factors affecting farmer participation in the CRP under 
uncertainty and irreversibility. It incorporates option values into land retirement 
decisions to determine  whether uncertainty and irreversibility  characteristics of the 
CRP affect the  probability of participation. The empirical application of the  model incor- 
porates land benefits, land attributes,  owner characteristics, and uncertainty associated 
with crop production and the CRP rental payments. The analysis contributes to the 
literature on CRP participation by incorporating uncertainty and irreversibility in 
estimation of the participation probabilities, and on the theory of  irreversible invest- 
ment under uncertainty by providing a framework for ex post analysis of  uncertainty 
and irreversibility. 
Results show that uncertainty and irreversibility of  the CRP impact farmers' 
participation decisions. Option values play a significant role in farmer decisions to retire 
land and reduce the  probability of farmer participation. Additionally, land benefits, land 
attributes, and farmer characteristics have significant impacts on the participation 
probabilities. The bid cap set has a positive impact on the CRP participation decision. 
Increases in production costs andlor decreases in crop revenues have positive impacts Isik and Yang  Farmer Participation in the Conservation Reserve Program  255 
Table 4. Endogeneity Tests for Selected Variables Used in the Estimations 
of Model I and Model I1 
Parameter  Parameter 
Variable  Estimate  P-Value  Estimate  P-Value 
Value of Crops Sold ($/acre) 
Crop Production Costs ($/acre)  -0.002  0.875  -0.002  0.868 
(0.014)  (0.014) 
Environmental Benefit Index (EBI)  0.039  0.338  0.019  0.587 
(0.035)  (0.037) 
Note: Values in parentheses are standard errors. 
Table 5. Grouped Logit Model Parameter Estimates of Alternative Specifi- 
cation of Model I1 for Proportion of County Land Offered 
Parameter Estimate 
Variable  Model I11  Model IV  Model V  Model VI  Model VII 
Constant 
Bid Cap ($/acre) 
Value of Crops Sold ($/acre) 
Crop Production Costs ($/acre) 
Government Payments ($/acre) 
Environmental Benefit Index (EBI) 
Proportion of Land in LCCs I or I1 
Proportion of Cropland Idle 
Average Age of Operator (years) 
Proportion of Land Operated by 
Full- or Part-Time Owners 
P/(P -  1) 
R  0.69  0.71  0.71  0.66  0.62 
Log Likelihood Function  -  176.9  -177.6  -  176.0  -  180.1  -  183.4 
Notes: Single, double, and  triple asterisks (*)denote statistical significance at  the lo%,  5%,  and 1%  levels, respec- 
tively. Values in parentheses are standard errors. 256  August 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
on the  decision to  participate. Lands  with higher EBI have a higher probability of parti- 
cipation. Counties  with higher proportions of cropland suitable for crop production tend 
to have lower enrollment in the CRP. Counties with higher proportions of landowners 
have higher participation rates. Older farmers also tend to participate more in  the  CRP 
than younger farmers. 
Public policies are  increasingly relying on the use of land retirement and conversion 
programs to  achieve environmental policy goals. The results from this study  have implica- 
tions for the design of conservation programs promoting shifts in behavior and develop- 
ment of estimates of environmental program performance. Program design should 
consider the  effects of sunk costs to participants and uncertainty about outcomes on parti- 
cipation decisions. Incorporating uncertainty and irreversibility  in  analyzing  conservation 
programs is important not only for the  design of appropriate incentive payments, but also 
for examining costs and benefits of such programs. Success of land retirement programs 
depends on appropriate design of  land rental payment and environmental benefit 
instruments as  well as effectively targeting environmentally sensitive cropland. 
While the CRP has made contributions in improving the quality of natural environ- 
ments, it has not been very effective in targeting environmentally sensitive cropland 
(U.S. General Accounting Office, 2002, p. 14), and some states in the Northeast region 
have experienced relatively low enrollment rates. Supplementary programs such as  the 
continuous CRP have also been established to target specific environmental concerns 
such as  improving water quality and wildlife by offering additional financial incentives 
to landowners  for establishingconservation  practices (Smith, 2000). These programs are 
considered to be more effective than the general CRP in addressing environmental 
concerns. Nevertheless, as of October 2001, enrollment in  these programs was very low 
in many states, accounting for less than 5% of the authorized CRP enrollment (U.S. 
General Accounting Office, 2002, p. 14). In  environmentally sensitive regions, providing 
financial incentives in addition to the land rental payments to landowners would help 
increase participation in these programs. This is consistent with the  recent changes 
made in the program design, which include offering additional economic incentives for 
landowners to enroll highly sensitive cropland. 
The results from this investigation also underscore the importance of incorporating 
uncertainty  and  irreversibility  into  cost-benefit analyses of conservation programs. This 
inclusion is  important because  the  option values affect participation probabilities, which 
would modify the  cost-benefit analysis of the program. Incorporating option values into 
the  cost-benefit analysis may provide more realistic assessments of policy performance. 
The model of irreversible investment under uncertainty appears to explain farmer 
participation decisions in the CRP in a satisfactory way, both from an economic and a 
statistical point of view. The theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty may 
become a useful tool for empirical investigations of various economic and social prob- 
lems. Up to now, it has been frequently used in ex ante simulations, but seldom as a 
basis of econometric models in ex post analysis of uncertainty and irreversibility. 
Further research in this area is needed to incorporate many important features of the 
theory of irreversible investment and various sources of uncertainty into the  estimation 
of behavioral econometric models. Future research should also consider whether option 
values are likely to have an important role in other land use decision making and 
environmental performance evaluations. 
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Appendix: 
Determination of Farmer's 
Optimal Annual Threshold Rental Payment 
The farmer's participation decision in the CRP is modeled by determining the annual threshold rental 
payment at  which it is optimal to participate in the CRP. Let V,'  represent this threshold value, which 
triggers farmer participation at year zero. The value of  the option to participate in the CRP (F(V, n)) 
depends on both n and V.  Since there is no uncertainty about the restoration costs K, both n and C(n, 
K) have the same parameters of  a geometric Brownian process. 
Dynamic optimization techniques are used to derive the participation threshold (as in Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994).  The Bellman equation is expressed as: 
Using Ito's lemma to expand the right-hand side (dF)  of equation (Al),  F(V, n) can be shown to satisfy 
the following differential equation: 
where F,  and F,,  are the derivatives of F(V, n) to n. This partial differential equation is solved subject 
to the boundary conditions: 
It is difficult to solve the partial differential equation in (A2)  with respect to (A31 because it depends 
on both n and V.  However, it would be easier to solve the problem in one dimension. Reducing the 
problem to one dimension leads to an ordinary differential equation and makes it possible to derive 
analytical results. Isik and Yang  Farmer Participation in the Conservation Reserve Program  259 
Assume that the optimal decision depends on the ratio, v = V/C(n, K). The value of the option should 
be homogeneous of  degree 1  in (IT,  V). We then can write F(V, IT) = C(n,  K)  f  (v),  where f  is the function 
to be determined. Differentiating F(V, x) with respect to x and V,  and substituting the related terms 
into (A21 leads to the following ordinary differential equation: 
This differential equation is solved with respect to a value-matching condition and two smooth-pasting 
conditions: 
Solving the partial differential equation in (A4) with respect to the boundary conditions given in (A51 
leads to the threshold ratio of the land rental payment to the agricultural returns from crop production 
at which it is optimal to participate in the CRP program: 